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On April 25, 1990 several thousand Moluccans gathered in The Hague to 
"celebrate" the fortieth anniversary of the South Moluccan Republic, the 
Republik Maluku Selatan or RMS. After a church ceremony, a protest 
march was held through the city. When the demonstration entered the 
neighborhood of the Indonesian embassy, a group of 600 youngsters 
spontaneously went to the embassy. Here they were stopped by a small 
police force. Before long, Moluccan youngsters were fighting with the police. 
In the meantime, most of the demonstrating Moluccans went to the 
"Houtrusthallen," where a celebration was to be held. While prominent 
leaders gave speeches between cultural performances inside, many 
Moluccans wandered around to meet relatives and friends outside. They 
talked, laughed, flew kites, or took walks. I observed some 10-year-old kids 
going for a walk in the city, while writing the abbreviation R.M.S. or slogans 
like "RMS Merdeka" ('Free RMS') on benches. 
Every year Moluccans come to The Hague to celebrate the anniversary 
of the RMS. Every year, the TV news services show part of the speech by 
RMS President Manusama, as well as some shots of cultural performances. 
This year was different. Dutch society, or at least the journalists, were 
shocked by the events at the Indonesian embassy. They wondered why and 
how they could have happened. The relationship between the Dutch and the 
Moluccans had improved, they thought, especially after the historic 1986 
agreement between the Moluccan political leaders and the Dutch 
government, concerning past Moluccan claims and future Moluccan 
welfare. Above all, for several years little had been heard about the RMS. 
The events at the embassy revived memories of the 1970s, when Moluccan 
youngsters hijacked trains and took hostages. A TV journalist even asked a 
Moluccan spokeswoman if Dutch society should prepare for new 
hijackings. Other journalists interviewed some of the youngsters involved in 
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the fight and wrote a sensational article about radicalizing youth (Elsevier, 
16 June 1990). 
The incident described above, and reactions to it, give a lot to think 
about. Moluccans came to the Netherlands 39 years ago and their history 
here has been marked by events and discussions concerning the RMS. So: 
What happened in The Hague? Does it show that nationalism never 
diminished or is it a signal of nationalist revivalism? Was it an outburst of 
social unrest in which nationalist symbols acted as catalyzer'? Why was 
Dutch society surprised by the events'? What do the Dutch know and think 
about Moluccan nationalism; do they understand it? To answer all these 
questions would take intensive research and go beyond the limits of this 
article. A more manageable question is: What is the history of Moluccan 
nationalism in the Netherlands and how is it explained by researchers'Z This 
article will describe Moluccan nationalism in some detail, its emergence and 
developments in the Netherlands. It will then review the main trends in 
analyzing Moluccan nationalism. Finally it will question whether these 
analyses provide sufficient understanding of Moluccan nationalism in the 
Netherlands. 
THE PRECEDING HISTORY 
In the Netherlands Indies many Moluccans, especially Christian Ambonese, I 
found employment in the colonial administration as teachers, clerks, lower 
officials, soldiers, and so forth. They occupied a special position in the 
colonial hierarchy, between the Dutch (and Europeans) and the indigenous 
population. In Ambonese society, the Christian Ambonese working for the 
colonial power formed a specific "middle class."2 
After the Pacific War, Moluccan soldiers fought beside the 
against Indonesian Republicans in an attempt to restore colonial rule; 
without success. The Dutch had to negotiate with the Indonesian 
Republicans on decolonization. In this postwar period, three main political 
orientations existed (or emerged) in the Moluccas. First, there was a 
movement striving for an unitary Indonesian state. Most of its leaders were 
Christians, its followers mainly Moslem. The second movement-with 
leaders and followers mainly Christians--favoured a federal structure for 
Indonesia. Their ideas coincided with the Dutch policy at that time. And the 
third movement (also mainly Christians) sought to remain in one way or 
another inside the Kingdom of the Netherlands. 
In 1949, in a compromise betwcen Indonesian Repu blicans and the 
Dutch, sovereignty was transferred to a Federation of Indonesian States 
(RepuMk Indonesia St-rikat, RIS). Shortly after independence, several 
federal states decided, with or without pressure, to join the Republic of 
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Indonesia. The RIS began to transform into a unitary republic. Members of 
the Special Forces3 and KNIL soldiers were involved in an attempt to keep 
troops of the central government om of the State of East Indonesia--of 
which the Moluccas was a part-and by doing so to stop the incorporation 
of this State into the Republic of Indonesia. This came to be known after its 
leader, as the coup of Andi Abdul Azis, who was a Buginese ex-KNIL 
captain, in Makassar (present-day Ujung Pandang). This coup eventually 
failed and the government of the State of East Indonesia declared itself 
willing to join the unitary state. Because of these developments, Moluccan 
leaders in Ambon, who used to favor federalism, now favored separatism. 
Although in representative bodies the separatists had no majority, they 
succeeded in proclaiming an independent Republic of South Moluccas 
(Republik Maluku Selatan, RMS) on April 25, 1950. In the developments 
which preceded this proclamation ex-KNIL soldiers and Special Forces 
played a key role.4 
The RMS leaders did not want to negotiate with the Indonesian 
Republicans, whereupon the latter invaded the Moluccan Islands. Guerilla 
resistance by RMS troops continued on the island of Seram until the arrest 
in 1963 of Dr. Ch. Soumokil, president of the RMS and leader of the 
resistance. 5 Soumokil was executed in 1966. 
When in 1949 the Dutch colonial domination in Indonesia ended, the KNIL 
had to be dissolved. Indigenous troops were given the options of either 
demobilizing or transferring to the new Indonesian army. The release of 
Moluccan soldiers did not run smoothly, due largely to the turbulent 
political changes that took place. 
At the time of the RMS proclamation about 4,000 Moluccan soldiers 
(formerly KNIU»), the last group to be released, were stationed in camps 
located mainly on Java. After the RMS was proclaimed, they sympathized 
with the newborn state and refused to demobilize in territory dominated 
Indonesian Republicans. They wanted to be demobilized either on the 
Moluccan island of Seram or in Dutch New Guinea. The Dutch government 
could not allow them to do so, for that would damage the fragile 
relationship with the new Indonesian government. The Moluccan soldiers 
were afraid the Dutch would release them in Indonesian controlled areas, so 
they filed suit against the Dutch government. As a result, a Dutch judge 
prohibited the Dutch government from demobilizing Moluccan soldiers 
against their will on Indonesian dominated territory. In order to escape a 
stalemate, the Dutch government decided to transfer the soldiers with their 
families to the Netherlands. In 1951 12,500 Moluccans came to Holland. 
temporarily they thought-as did the Dutch. 
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Nowadays the Moluccan community in the Netherlands contains an 
estimated 42,000 persons, including Moluccans serving in the Dutch Navy at 
the time of decolonization and a small group of Moluccans that came to the 
Netherlands in later years. 
MOLUCCAN NATIONALISM IN THE NETHERLANDS 
Arriving in the Netherlands, the Moluccan soldiers were discharged from the 
army and given housing in former monasteries and concentration camps. 
They lived socially and geographically isolated from the Dutch. Most of the 
camps were siwated at a distance from villages and in the first years there 
was no stimulus at all to find work. In the mid-fifties this situation changed. 
Moluccans were encouraged to find jobs and in the sixties the Moluccans 
were transferred to special wards in small rural towns. There was, however, 
an exception: Moluccans serving in the Dutch Royal Navy. Because the 
Navy was not a part of the colonial military forces, the Moluccans were 
given the options to demobilize, to transfer to the new Indonesian navy, or 
to stay in service. The Moluccans who decided upon the latter were not 
discharged. They stayed in service, and some were given housing in special 
camps or wards near a navy harbor or training center. (Some Moluccan 
navy men were sent on duty to the Dutch Antilles.) They were not isolated in 
the same way as the former KNIL soldiers were. 
Already in the camps Moluccan nationalism (supporting the RMS) 
became part of everyday life, and nationalist ideas became intertwined in the 
Moluccan church. Parades were held, RMS flags raised and special prayer-
meetings were held for the guerilla resistance on Seram. 7 The Moluccan 
church became an important intermediary in the spread and consolidation 
of the RMS ideal. In the early fifties several delegations were send to the 
Netherlands by the RMS government at Seram, to find support for the 
Moluccan cause. In The Hague, the RMS government had its own 
representative: the Bureau South Moluccas. In their nationalist orientation, 
the newly arrived Moluccans were also supported by Dutch right-wing 
Calvinist organizations. Attempts by the Dutch government to prevent 
contacts between the Moluccans in the camps and the outside, namely, the 
Bureau and Dutch sympathizers, were without success. The Moluccan 
nationalist movement in the Netherlands grew stronger, Several mass 
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According to Wittermans, the Moluccans in the camps were in favour of 
signing on. Two organizations, to which most of the Moluccans belonged, 
demands some conditions before they would accept the offer. The demands 
included explicit recognition and support for the RMS by the Dutch 
government and the exercise of their demobilization rights by Moluccans. 
The Dutch government either could not or would not meet those demands, 
but nevertheless distributed enlistment forms. Only 39 persons signed up, all 
of them of Southeast Moluccan descent. Wittennans questions why so few 
Moluccans signed, Possible motives could be fear of repercussions or 
manipulation by leaders. According to Wiltermans, the main motive was 
nationalist feelings. An inquiry concerning the willingness of Moluccans to 
return to Indonesia, carried out a few months after the incident, confirmed 
his analysis. This inquiry covered most male heads of households and was 
carried out in private, so there could not be any public control as was 
possible in the case of the conscription lists. Only 5 persons(1) answered that 
they wanted to return to Indonesia. 
The main political goal for the Moluccans in the Netherlands was support 
for the guerilla resistance on Seram. They tried to provide support by 
collecting money and seeking recognition of the RMS on the national 
(Netherlands) and international level. From 1953 on, several splits took 
place in the nationalist movement Although divided in different 
organizations, the majority of the Moluccans in the Netherlands supported 
the RMS. Most of the nationalist leaders were intellectuals and former 
subofficers of the colonial army, 
I A radical change took place about the mid-sixties when Soumokil was arrested and the guerilla war in the Moluccas came to an end. By that time the Dutch policy towards Moluccans had already changed. They were to be transferred to special wards8 and since 1956 were encouraged to integrate themselves into the Dutch labor market. After Soumokil was executed in t 1966, successful attempts were made to unify Moluccan organizations in the 
Netherlands. At one meeting, a new organization, the Badan Persatuan 
(body of unity), was founded and a government in exile was established. 
J. A. Manusama, who came to the Netherlands as a member of one of the 
delegations in the early fifties and was one of the initiators of the RMS 
proclamation, became the new RMS president. 9 With the establishment of 
demonstrations, attended by Moluccans from camps all over Holland, were this government in exile, the perspectives of the RMS changed radically. 
held in The Hague, There was no longer a clear movement in the Moluccas, for which support 
The strong nationalist orientation among the inhabitants of the camps ?r recognition could be asked, The nationalist initiative came completely 
Into the hands of the Moluccan exiles in the Netherlands. may be illustrated by what is called the 1952 incident (Wittermans 
1955:2531T"                In 1952 the Dutch authorities offered 3,000 At the same time, another important change took place. Until the 
beginning of the sixties Moluccan youngsters were hardly involved in the Moluccans the chance to join a civil guard corps to guard military objects, 
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political arena of Moluccan nationalism as political cadres. This was the 
terrain of the first generation. From 1960 on, youngsters started to organize 
themselves and participated more prominently in mass demonstrations. 10 In 
1966, second-generation Moluccans started to take the initiative in political 
action. Their actions were more radical than those of their parents. set 
fire to the Indonesian embassy in 1966, and in 1970 they attacked the 
residence of the Indonesian ambassador in Wassenaar and took II 
During the mid-seventies some trains were hijacked and were 
taken. 12 Besides taking more radical actions, the second generation also 
apl:>ea.led to another ideology. They placed their struggle in the context of 
anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism, ideologies which were quite popular 
at that time. 
In the mid-seventies, other important changes took place. The ideology of 
the nationalist movement at arrival in the Netherlands was a separatist one. 
There was hardly any room for other opinions. Camp councils were 
dominated by members ofRMS organizations, in fact they functioned in the 
structure of those organizations (Wittermans 1955:375). Sodal control, part 
of everyday life in the camps and kept dissident thinking under 
control. This did not mean other ideas did not exist. AJready in the frrst 
years of their stay in the Netherlands, some groups of Moluccans turned 
their backs on the RMS. Most of these did not belong to the majority of 
Christians from the central Moluccas; they originated from the Southeast 
Moluccas or were Moslems from the central Moluccas. 13 Unlike these 
"dissident" groups many Moluccans serving the navy stayed loyal to the 
nationalistic cause of the Moluccans. Whenever clashes occurred between 
competing RMS groups or between RMS and non-RMS groups, the Dutch 
authorities responded by transferring one of the factions (or its leaders) to 
another camp. 
At the end of the sixties and early seventies, leftist Moluccan 
students--most students living outside the wards--started to examine their 
Own and Indonesian history. They started to doubt that the RMS was the 
best solution for the future of themselves and of their fellow Moluccans in 
the Moluccas. Inside the wards, a group of youngsters were involved in the 
same process. There was a big difference between the two groups. The 
students could easily express their doubts, while the youngsters in the wards 
had to reckon with the social control that surrounded them. 
In the mid-seventies, because of the hijackings and hostage-takings, a 
lively discussion on the RMS and the future of Moluccans took place inside 
the Moluccan community. Slowly a process of rethinking the RMS ideology 
spread among a broad group of Moluccans. Two factors influenced this 
process. First was a continuous process of social differentiation in the 
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Moluccan community, which had remained rather homogeneous the first 
decade and a half. 14 The social differentiation made it easier to get in touch 
with other ideas or ways to look upon A second important factor 
was the change in Indonesian policy and Moluccan attitude towards visits to 
the Moluccas during the second half of the seventies. Earlier the Indonesian 
government had put many restrictions on visits to the Moluccas, and the 
Moluccans in the Netherlands thought of such visits as treachery because 
the Moluccas were seen as occupied territory. By visiting the Moluccas, 
Moluccans could (and had to) reconsider their relationship with their home 
country, a relationship that used to be dominated by the RMS. 
Many Moluccans also started to doubt if they would be able to live in 
the Moluccas. The social pressure to stick to separatist ideas slowly was 
replaced by a more tolerant political climate. AJthough many Moluccans 
and some organizations abandoned the separatist ideology, this did not 
mean they were no longer nationalist. RMS and non-RMS groups both 
agreed on the need for self-determination for the Moluccas. 
At the same social problems in the Moluccan community-like 
drug-abuse, housing and unemployment-reached a point at which 
something had to be done to solve them. Because of the inability of Dutch 
organizations to solve the problems and the existence of their own self-help 
tradition, Moluccans started to set up their own organizations dealing with 
those social problems. 15 £t was also in this context that in 1986 the historical 
agreement between Moluccan leaders and the Dutch government was 
achieved. In a way Moluccans starred to realize that they would not return 
to the Moluccas on short notice and therefore also had 10 find a way to 
survive in the Netherlands. Although formed to deal with social problems, 
many organizations dealt with political issues (such as the RMS and the 
transfer of Moluccans to the Netherlands) in analyzing problems and in 
developing methods. Most of the workers in those organizations belong to 
the younger generation. During the second half of the eighties, many 
younger Moluccans bec,une active in the so called                
organization based on and organizing support for the ancestral village. By 
doing so they were seeking new ways to express their relalion with the 
Moluccas. 
THE LITERATURE 
The literature on the RMS in the Netherlands is extensive, although there 
has hardly been any specific sociological research on this subject. Only 
Wittermans' research (1955) explicitly covered the terrain of nationalism 
among Moluceans. 16 Others wrote on the RMS because it is an important 
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aspect of Moluccan life in the Netherlands. 17 How did various writers 
explain RMS nationalism among the succeeding generations of Moluccans'! 
Wittennans, who with regard to the "1952 incident" argued that 
nationalism penneated the everyday lives of the Moluccans after arriving in 
the Netherlands, summarizes in the last chapter of his thesis (1955:319): 
Ambonese nationalism a direct protest against a centralized 
Indonesian government-has been related [by Wittennans] to 
in the social and political position of the group subsequent 
to the transfer of sovereignty. The evacuation of the soldiers who 
had joined the Ambonese nationalistic movement, resulted in a 
continuation of the movement in Holland. 
The continuation of the nationalistic movement in the Netherlands was not 
just a sequel to its start in Indonesia. Specific circumstances in the 
Netherlands contributed to this. Firstly the unexpected discharge from the 
anny. This, according to Wittennans and Gist, "deprived them of status in 
their new environment" (1962:317). Therefore: 
Their struggle in the Netherlands, manifestly a struggle for group 
recognition, would seem to be motivated by a common feeling of 
status deprivation. Group recognition in terms of achieved national 
independence would imply a new and status for all and 
a compensation for individual feelings ofdeprivation. 
A second important factor was the social and geographical isolation of the 
Moluccans. Because of this segregation "traditional relations do not have to 
meet the strain of economic competition and there is time and opportunity 
to concentrate on specific group interests" (Wittennans 1955:313). 
Nationalism and religion-which was intertwined with nationalism-were 
two of the most prominent spheres ofgroup interests (1955:313). 
Both factors, deprivation and isolation, have since been cited by most 
writers to explain nationalism among the first generation of Moluccans in 
the Netherlands. For example Van Amersfoort states that isolation 
stimulated group cohesion and expectations of the future (RMS) (l971:35). 
the RMS ideal was a stumbling-block to contact with the 
surrounding Dutch society, because such contact could damage the RMS 
stn.lggJe (1971 :36; Regeringsnota 1978:28). 
The isolation factor even fostered nationalistic feelings among w>Ilnl!Cr 
generations. Or in the words of the Dutch government: 
Also the social isolation initially stimulated by the Dutch 
government in the fonn of camps and wards helped, by 
strengthening the traditional Moluccan group-cohesion, to create 
conditions to transfer the RMS ideal (Regeringsnota 1978:27) 
Comparable statements were made by the Krisisgroep (1970:9,23).18 The 
younger generation did not experience a loss of status because of political 
changes in Indonesia or a discharge from the anny as their parents did, so 
the factor deprivation was not valid for them. 19 Elaborating on this theme, 
however, the situation of younger generations was interpreted as "relatively 
deprived." They had little chance for upward mobility (Krisisgroep 1970:22; 
Regeringsnota 1978:27), they identified themselves with their Dutch peers 
but were rejected (Maricn 1968:74, Oen Kay Liat 1975:14). According to 
these writers the Moluccan youngsters had two different reference groups. 
First, a Dutch one, providing them materialist identification, and second, a 
Moluccan one providing emotional identification. Because of rejection 
the first reference group, the youngsters became "relatively" deprived and 
clung to the nationalist ideals of their parents and older brothers and sisters 
(Marien 1971:73). 
One should keep in mind that not most-ideological and 
nationalistic movements are products of fnlstration, alienation and 
the feeling of not having a chance, among young people. 
(Ellemers 1979: 112; original emj,hasls) 
In their nationalist orientation, these youngsters were influenced by the 
western world they lived in. They were influenced by the Black Panther 
movement and Palestinian liberation movement, and therefore were more 
radical in their methods of action than their parents (Marien 1971:68; 
Bartels 1989:224). To some extent, these analyses reduce the nationalist 
among Moluccan youngsters to a youth problem (Ellemers 
197': 113).20 EJlemers suggested that measures should be taken to improve 
socioeconomic position of Moluccans, and that the Dutch government 
take a clear stand on the RMS. Unlike others, he doubts if "cultural 
pluralist" alternatives would be a solution (EJlemers 1979: 115-l 
ElJemers was served at once: after a Dutch version of his article was 
published (978), the Dutch government published a report on the 
Moluccan community in the Netherlands (Regeringsnota 1978). This 
:'Regeringsnota" analyzed the history and situation of the Moluccans and 
Introduced the measures EJlemers asked for In a postscript to the English 
version of his article on this "Regeringsnota," Ellemers pointed out a 
considerable discrepancy between what ;as advocated by the government 
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(supported by the majority of the Dutch population, according to Ellemers) 
"and the aspirations of a (large?) part of the Moluccans in the Netherlands" 
li8). The main problem was "the unwillingness of the Moluccan 
leaders to see the problems of their group in any but a poktical 
(1979: I original emphasis). 
In the 1980s this immovable attitude of the leaders seems to have 
changed. In 1986 an agreement between Moluccan leaders and the Dutch 
government was reached, concerning the past claims and future welfare of 
the Moluccans. 21 The younger generation played a key role in the 
negotiations preceding the agreement (Bartels 1989:461). "They were willing 
to exclude 'tabooed' issues like the RMS question," so "by abandoning the 
hard line of the first generation leadership, they made it possible that an 
agreement could be reached" (Bartels 1989:461). According to Bartels, the 
RMS ideal "has been put on the back burner by many of the middle 
generation (ca. 2545 years of and is definitely secondary for most of 
the youngest generation" (1986:37). He considers the hijackings in the 
seventies as a turning of tide: 
The hijackings clearly shocked many Moluccans into a realization 
of the hopelessness of attaining the RMS and the small prospects of 
a collective return to the Moluccas in the near future (1986:36). 
They also started to realize the possible consequences of a return: would 
they be accepted by their fellow Moluccans and would they be able to cope 
with the living conditions in the Moluccas? 
Bartels therefore concludes that: 
The RMS issue is largely doonant now and possibly may be allowed 
to expire over time but only if Moluccans find a new direction in 
their lives, one which makes it meaningful to participate in Dutch 
society. Increasing numbers are embarking in that direction, but for 
this they need encouragement and assurances of welcome and' 
belonging from both the Dutch public and authorities 0989:488) 
In a sense, the same statement-that the RMS will fade into the background 
but. depending on future developments, can revive again-is given bvearlier 
writers (For example Wittermans & Gist 1962:3 
SUFFICIENTLY EXPLAINED? 
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developments of Moluccan nationalism, as described in the first paragraphs 
of this article. 
Central issues or factors in the analyses turned out to be: "deprivation," 
"frustration," "isolation," and "impediments to social mobility in Dutch 
society." Surely all these factors influenced the emergence and orientation 
toward nationalism among Moluccans to a greater or lesser extent, but 
again are they conclusive? Let us reconsider some points and see if the 
analyses provide us with adequate answers. 
The first point concerns the link between nationalist orientation and 
"deprivation and isolation." Earlier we mentioned the Moluccans serving in 
the Royal Navy, who were not discharged and did not live in the same 
isolated conditions as the majority of the Moluccans. Nevertheless many of 
them cherished the nationalist ideals of the RMS. This is in contrast with the 
Southeast Moluccans who were discharged and lived under the same 
conditions as the majority, and some of whom rejected the RMS ideals. This 
could mean that (relative) "deprivation" and "isolation" cannot be 
interpreted as simple causal factors or even as the most important factors (as 
seems the case in some analyses). The socioeconomic factors are more 
complex and do not answer the question why some subcategories of 
Moluccans were attracted by nationalist ideals while others were not. Other 
influences might be of more importance in this matter. To stay with the 
already mentioned subcategories, we may suggest that belonging to a 
specific culture group and religion could have played a crucial role. 
Southeast Moluccans belong to a separate culture group from the majority 
(Bartels 1989:20) and about 23% of them have a different religion 
(Catholic).22 Not all Southeast Moluccans turned their backs upon the 
RMS. During research visits among Moluccans, I on several occasions got 
to know Southeast Moluccans who were loyal to the nationalist goals, and 
all of them Protestant. 23 Also there were Protestant Moluccans serving the 
Navy who do not belong to the major culture group (from the central 
Moluccas)-bul for example originated from a group of Islands in the 
Southwest Moluccas (the so-called TNS islands: Teun, Nila. and 
Serua)-who were strongly cOlllmitted to the RMS ideal. 24 
A second point we may question is the connection between decline of 
Ir nationalism and possible improvement of the socioeconomic position of Moluccans in the Netherlands, as the Dutch government argued. When we look upon the developments in the late 1970s and beginning of the 1980s, we see that it was the Moluccan students who started to redefine the RMS t ideology and policy and were looking for nationalist alternatives. It was also! the better educated Moluccans who achieved the historical agreement in 
Do the analyses cited above sufficiently explain Moluccan nationalism in 1986 and who are working in many group-specific organizations, of which 
The Netherlands? In other words, do they help us understand the many integrate nationalist ideas in their work. This by no means indicates 
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that further integration in, for example, the Dutch educational system would 
lead to a decline in nationalism. We have to consider the possibility that 
social mobility by Moluccans in a way contributed to changes in ideology 
and strategy. In addition, many leaders of nationalist organizations already 
live outside the wards and therefore are to some extent integrated in Dutch 
society 
Third, the changes in strategy and ideology of Molua:an nationalists, 
like the radicalization from the mid-l960s on, are explained by western 
influences and "relative deprivation." At the same time, radical changes in 
the domain of political initiative took place, as initiative passed completely 
into the hands of the exiles. We might question if Moluccan youngsters 
would have used the same radical methods of action as long as there was a 
guerilla war in the Moluccas. Also the growing stream of visits to the 
Moluccas in the end of the 1970s is not really incorporated in the analyses of 
nationalism. Bartels (1986:37) argues that those journeys created 
ambivalence about the possibility of return: Would they be accepted and 
would they be able to live under less luxurious conditions? Although these 
points are all valid, the visits to the Moluccas did not necessarily result in 
rejection of the RMS ideal, but rather in a search for alternatives. 
A last issue I want to discuss here concerns the way the orientation 
toward welfare work is interpreted. It is considered to be a sign of 
enfeeblement of the nationalist ideal, because it is thought to imply a 
stronger orientation toward Dutch society and abandonment of the idea of 
returning to the Moluccas. Not included in the analyses are the already 
mentioned nationalistic dimension of a part of this welfare work, and the 
restrictions on social work because of subsidies from the Dutch 
government. 25 Because of the latter, Molua:an welfare organizations can 
not openly act as political organizations. In analyzing the developments in 
the domain of welfare, we have to weigh the possibility that at present 
Moluccan nationalism continues via welfare organizations in a way similar 
to the manner in which religion helped spread and consolidate nationalism 
in the 1950s. 
FINAL REMARKS 
If we examine the four points discussed above, we have to conclude that the 
available analyses do not give us adequate or sufficient answers to all 
questions concerning the development of Moluccan nationalism. Surely they 
all give important insights and explain the conduits or conditions that 
helped to stimulate Moluccan nationalism. In this way the analyses are very 
useful. However, they did not focus on the nature of Moluccan nationalism. 
They seem to consider the RMS ideal as rigid, not as a dynamic ideal and 
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movement which changes over time. The available analyses therefore do not 
enable us to understand for example what happened in The Hague on 
April 25, 1990. Moluccans have been living in the Netherlands for 40 years 
now, but the history of their nationalism-labeled as the core of their 
identity-still is "an unexplored history." 
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NOTES 
1.  "Ambonese" refers to the island of Ambon or the "Ambonese culture-
circle" enclosing the Ambon and Lease islands, in the central Moluccas. 
Ambonese was also used as the name for people from the other 
Moluccan islands, because the administrative center was Ambon town. 
After arriving in the Netherlands the Moluccans initially were called 
"Ambonese." Later on this changed into "South-Moluccans" or 
"Moluccans." In this article I will use "Moluccans" with the exception 
of quotations. 
2.  ChauveI1985:240, 1990a:2-J. For further information on the history of 
the Moluccas and Moluccans, see Chauvel 199Gb and van Kaam 1977, 
among others. 
3.  The Special Forces (Depot Speciale Troepen) was a special commando 
unit trained for counterinsurgency. 
4.  For more detailed information see Chauvel 1990b, Penonton 1977, and 
van Kaam 1977. 
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5.  According to after the arrest of Soumokil the command of the 
guerilla resistance was taken ovcr by RMS Colonel E. Sopamena 
(1989:212). 
6.  The KNIL was dissolved on July 26, 1950. All KNIL soldiers who were 
still in service at that moment wcre givcn the status of Koninklijke 
Landmacht (KL, Royal Army). 
7.  Moluccan army chaplains established an independent Moluccan church 
after arriving. For detailed information on nationalism in camp life, see 
Wittermans 1955, ch. 6. For the relationship between the Moluccan 
church and nationalism, see Redactieteam 1989: 130-164. 
8.  The process of transferring Moluccans from camps to special wards 
began in thc sixties and took about 20 years. In 1991 there is still one 
camp. A group of inhabitants do not want to be removed to a ward. The 
Dutch government promised to improve the camp. 
9.  After this peculiar act of unification, other splits took place. In 1969, for 
example, L TamaeIa set up a competing government. His organization 
worked mainly in Unitcd Nations cirdes. After his death in 1978, his 
movement split again. These kinds of splits took place into the eighties. 
It is not necessary for the purpose of this article to go further into the 
10.  the young political cadre came from religious youth 
organizations (Redactieteam 1989: 
I I.  Tete Siahaya one of the activists. describes both actions. 
12.  See also Schmid et al. 1982. 
13.  About 23.5% of the male adults in 1951 originated from the Southeast 
Moluccas and about 76.5% from the central Moluccas. About of 
the Southeast Moluccans were Catholic, the others Protestant. Just 
2.5% of the adult males originating from the central Moluccas were 
Moslem, the others Protestant (Wittennans 1955: I 
14.  Social differentiation in the fields of 
occupation. 
NATIONALISM AMONG MOLUCCANS 
15.  This was most obvious in the field of aid to drug addicts. Drug abuse 
was a very serious problem in the late 1970s. For information on the 
emergence of Moluccan abuse and drug aid see Steijlen 1984. 
16.  In addition to Wittermans two other writings dealt mainly with 
the RMS: (1970) and Oen Kay Liat (1975). Both writings 
can be characterized as pamphlets supporting the RMS causc. 
17.  Much of the literature deals also with the legitimacy of the RMS 
proclamation. For a review. see Chauvel 1978. 
                 or 011dcTLoeksgroep Krisissituaties (Crisis Research 
connected to the sociological institute of the University of 
Amsterdam was designed to conduct research on short notice in 
situations of crises or conflict. The purpose of the report on Moluccans 
was to present more infonnation on the Moluccans preceding the trial 
of33 Moluccans involved in the hostage-taking in Wassenaar in 1970. 
19.  Although it is often stated that the parental experience of deprivation 
and being betrayed by the Dutch is internalized by younger generation 
Moluccans, which means that those experiences (in)directlv influenced 
youngsters. 
20.  Or in the words of Marien (1971:74): "The conclusion scems justified 
that in essence the youth movement does not deal with a nationalistic 
stmggle, but is a social emancipation movement of a relatively deprived 
group, that only can identify itself by a symbol referring to nationalism, 
the RMS. 
21.  Among other things, the agreement consisted of a medal of honor for 
the former KNIL soldiers or their widows, a yearly bonus of 2,000 
guilders, special measures to cope with the high unemployment among 
Moluccans, and agreements on the responsibility for housing and 
Moluccan church buildings. There has been also a lot of criticism on the 
agreement between the Dutch government and Moluccan leaders. 
According to those critics the medal and yearly bonus had to be 
considered as "blood money" or an attempt of the Dutch government to 
close the "Moluccan chapter." Critics had very little confidence in the 
special measures for Moluccan unemployment. 
22.  For Southeast Moluccans, see Renwarin 1983 and 1986. 
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23.  I wish to emphasize that this observation is not based upon systematic 
research. 
24.  For Southeast Moluccans and people from the TNS islands, I use the 
term culture group instead of ethnic group to emphasize that they have 
an adat different from that of the majority originating from the central 
Moluccas. 
25.  Most welfare organizations are financed by government organizations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It is unsettling, sometimes, to ponder the worth of our scholarship to future 
generations of scholars. Will our work be of any value to them'? For field-
and data-oriented linguists, the question is more fundamental-"'I:io even data 
endure? After many frustrating hours wasted with reference grammars 
written in frameworks that make them all but unusable to askers of other 
kinds of questions, it is reassuring and even inspiring to come upon 1. P. B. 
de Josselin de Jong's Wetan FieJdnotes. Written over half a century ago, the 
linguistic analyses still speak to loday's issues, and the texts contain data 
that truly have endured. 
It is hard, when faced with a source of infonnation as rich as Wetan 
Fieldnotes, to restrict oneself to a simple review of the book. There are data 
there, data that are fascinating, stimulating and tantalizing, about a little-
known member of the Austronesian family. For that reason, this piece, 
which began as a book review, has developed into a case study of how the 
